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In reading the book, one cannot but be reminded of Külpe's recent remark: "It may be said of all such mental states, that they rather present to us problems that call for explanation, than contribute to our knowledge of general [*i.e.*, normal] psychology" (*Grundriss*, p. 17). That it is normal which aids abnormal psychology; and that the latter, if aided at all by the former, is assisted in a very much smaller degree, seem to be propositions of such obvious truth that they should be more universally recognized. M. Janet is frank in his own admissions: *cf.* pp. 79, 80 (amnesia), 213, 214 (emotion). It is strange that he says nothing of aboulia under this head. Until normal psychologists are at one in a theory of conation, an analytical diagnosis of aboulia appears impossible.

In the meantime the reader must be cautioned against ascribing rigidity or finality to such technical terms as abound in this book. They are only convenient rubrics for embracing groups of phenomena which present similar external characteristics, but the exact analysis of which cannot be at present looked for. That this is true is in part indicated by the author's strict adherence to the particular and concrete: though in part, no doubt, such adherence is only indicative of the line of his own least mental resistance.

E. B. T.

Zur Analyse des Apperceptionsbegriffes, eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung. Von J. KODIS. Berlin, Calvary & Co., 1893. — pp. 202.

This essay falls into two parts: (1) a historical investigation of the concept of apperception, and (2) an investigation of the mental phenomena covered by the term in the light of Avenarius' *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung*. The first occupies 150 pages of the whole 200.

The historical discussion deals with Descartes (10 pp.), Leibniz (16 pp.), Wolf (6 pp.), Kant (10 pp.), Herbart (26 pp.), Steinthal (22 pp.), Lazarus (8 pp.), Wundt (41 pp.), and Avenarius (6 pp.). This part of the author's work is distinctly well done. Not every detail is given of the various views noticed, but the treatment is clear, and first-hand references full. It is curious that among the critical papers cited that of Külpe does not appear.

The second section of the monograph is hardly so successful. For one thing, it is far too brief. Avenarius' terminology is difficult at best, and the brevity of this exposition leaves it well-nigh unintelligible to the reader unacquainted with the *Kritik*. Secondly, the chapters contain far more of assertion, and of indication of possibilities, than of argument and reference to facts. We have (1) a statement of the standpoint and method of the *Kritik*. Here it is pointed out that Avenarius' derivation of the uniformity of his psychical values ("menschliche Aussageninhalte") does away with Wundt's notion of mental causality, and modifies the Herbartian view of the fundamental knowledge-process (pp. 163, 164). Then follows (2) a

chapter dealing with appetite¹ ("appetitives Verhalten"). Here Avenarius, in his doctrine of will, is the polar opposite of Leibniz and Wundt. On the particular matter of attention, the author notices an approximation of the two directions in the second edition of Wundt's *Vorlesungen*: this now appears also in the fourth edition of the *Phys. Psych.* But it must not be pressed to a divergence in principle from earlier views (pp. 165-7; 177, 8; 180, 1). The following three chapters treat of apperception (3) as a process which changes obscure ideas into clear (Leibniz, Steinthal, Wundt: *cf.* p. 186); (4) as a movement of two ideational masses towards one another for the production of knowledge (Herbart); (5) as reflexive knowledge (Leibniz, Wolf, Kant).

"I conclude," says the writer (p. 202), "that with a mechanical view of biological phenomena and the assumption of a dependency of psychical values upon them, the mechanical view of the 'psyche' not only becomes possible, but proves to be the necessary and only consequent hypothesis." Of course, 'mechanical' has here a special, technical sense. Our verdict, on the evidence, must be 'not proven.' Perhaps Herr Kodis will one day return to the same topic at greater length: he has in eminent degree the gift of clear exposition.

E. B. T.

The Psychology of Childhood. By F. TRACY. With Introduction by G. STANLEY HALL. Boston, D. C. Heath & Co., 1893. — pp. 94.

"The author," says President Hall, "has here undertaken to present as concisely, yet as completely as possible, the results of the systematic study of children up to date. . . . This work . . . has been done with . . . thoroughness. . . . This dissertation is far more than a compilation. It brings important additions to our knowledge upon some of the most important topics. This is, perhaps, most important in the case of the chapter on language, almost a monograph in itself, and which will interest philologists as well as psychologists and teachers." The work falls into the following sections: (1) *Preliminary*; (2) *Sensation* (sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, temperature, organic sensations, muscular feelings); (3) *Emotion* (fear, anger, surprise-astonishment-curiosity, aesthetic feelings, love-sympathy-jealousy); (4) *Intellect* (perception, memory, association, imagination, the discursive processes, idea of self); (5) *Volition* (impulsive movements, reflex movements, instinctive movements, ideational movements); (6) *Language of Childhood*, reprinted from the *Am. Journal of Psych.*, VI. 1 (heredity *vs.* education in language, the physiological development, phonetic and psychic development). Review is superfluous.

E. B. T.

¹ If Avenarius knew nothing of Bastian (p. 179), Herr Kodis seems to know him only in the French of the *Rev. Phil.*, and therefore to have overlooked the criticisms of his article which have appeared in *Brain*.